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Abstract
The paper reviews the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. It is highlighted that the 
Pacific coast of the country forms part of the so called “Ring of fire”. Overall, the 
risk of tsunami that has the potentiality to affect communities along the Pacific 
coast of the country are twofold: a). Local tsunami; i.e., those triggered by earth-
quakes originating from the “Cocos”, “Rivera” and the “North American” plates 
(high risk); and b) the remote tsunamis, those generated elsewhere (e.g, Alaska, 
Japan, Chile) (low risk). Further, a preliminary model for a “tsunami early warn-
ing” system for the case of Mexico is put forward.
Keywords: tsunami, earthquake, Mexico, tsunami early warning
1. Introduction
A tsunami has been defined as “a series of travelling waves of extremely long length 
and period, usually generated by disturbances associated with earthquake occurring 
below or near the ocean floor … Volcanic eruptions, submarine landslides, and coastal 
rock falls can also generate tsunamis, as can a large meteorite impacting the ocean” [1]. 
Also, tsunamis may be regarded as low frequency events but with high impacts in terms 
of human/infrastructure/economic losses. Their power of destruction has been more 
than evident in recent years [2–11]. It is believed that from the time period between 
1998 and 2017, the losses inflicted by tsunami disasters were a total of US$280 billion 
and 251,770 causalities, in damages [7]. Moreover, the authors argue that the impact 
from this period has been 100 times higher than during the time period 1978–1997.
Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, there has been a large amount 
of literature published on several topics associated with tsunami science. For 
example, research has been conducted on the physics of tsunami waves [12], tsuna-
mi’s impact and characteristics [1–3, 11, 13], tsunami early warning systems [14, 15], 
tsunami risk assessment [10, 11, 16], geology’s perspective [17–19], to mention a few.
Recent tsunamis have highlighted the need for an effective early warning system. An 
early warning is defined as “the provision of timely and effective information, through 
identified institutions, that allows individuals exposed to a hazard to take action to 
avoid or reduce their risk and prepare for effective response” [20]. Moreover, the United 
Nations Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
(UN/ISDR) argues that an “effective early warning system” should include the follow-
ing four key elements: “the knowledge of risks”, “the technical monitoring and warning 
service”, “dissemination & communication of meaningful warnings to those at risk”, 
and “the public awareness and preparedness to react to warnings” [20, 21].
The objective of the paper is to highlight the tsunami risk in Mexico. The data 
presented in the paper are based on previous studies on tsunamis in the country  
[15, 22]. Further, a preliminary “tsunami early warning” system which aims at 
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integrating, for example, the four key elements proposed by the UNISDR [20] for 
the case of Mexico is presented.
2. The risk of tsunamis in Mexico
The “Pacific ring of fire” belt covers a vast area of highly active tectonic plate 
boundaries where most of the earthquakes originate and active volcanoes (Figure 1). 
It is believed that three quarters of all the volcanoes in the world are in the ring [23].
Further, the “Ring of fire” runs through several countries, such as Canada, 
USA, Russia, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, New Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Mexico.
Regarding the tsunami risk in Mexico, studies based on tsunami historical data 
showed that there are two zones of tsunami threat: local (i.e., generation of tsuna-
mis) and remote (i.e., arrival of tsunamis) (Figure 2) [15, 22]. The authors defined 
these two zones by considering the nature of the faulting and tectonic plate interac-
tion. In the subsequent subsection each of these will be addressed.
2.1 Local tsunami risk
According to [15, 22] at the west of the “Rivera plate” and along the “Middle 
America trench,” the “Cocos plate” subduction beneath the “North American plate” 
at rates of 2.5 to 7.7 cm/year (Figure 2). Given the fact, that large earthquakes occur 
in this region; therefore, the zone has been regarded as a generator of tsunamis 
(Table 1 and Figure 3).
According to historical data, the generated tsunamis that produced the high-
est wave heights were those that occurred in 1925 (7–11 m), 1932 (9–10 m), 
1995 (2.9–5.10 m), 1985 (1–3 m). For example, the 1985 earthquake of M8.0 of 
magnitude generated a tsunami that affected several communities in this zone. 
It is believed that a key infrastructure port was affected with waves of 2.5 m 
and flooded the area about 500 m inland [15]. Also, several tourist resorts were 
affected by the tsunami; for example, waves for up to 2.5 m high were observed in 
Playa Azul [15].
Interestingly, a day after the main earthquake, a M7.5 aftershock hit the zone; 
it is thought the generated tsunami affected a local fishing community with waves 
ranging from 2 to 3 m high [15].
Figure 1. 
The “Ring of fire” [23].
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Figure 2. 
Mexico’s local & remote tsunami threat [15, 22].
Year Region Magnitude Tsunami (places hit, Mexico) Max. height 
waves (m)
1732 Guerrero — Acapulco 4.0
1754 Guerrero — Acapulco 5.0
1787 Guerrero >8.0 Acapulco 3–8




1820 Guerrero 7.6 Acapulco 4.0
1852 B. C. — Río Colorado 3.0
1907 Guerrero 7.6 Acapulco 2.0
1925 Guerrero 7.0 Zihuatanejo 7.0–11.0




1932 Jalisco 7.8 Manzanillo 1.0
1932 Jalisco 6.9 Cuyutlán 9.0–10.0
1948 Nayarit 6.9 Islas Marias 2.0–5.0
1957 Guerrero 7.8 Acapulco 2.6
1973 Colima 7.6 Manzanillo 1.1
1978 Oaxaca 7.6 Puerto Escondido 1.5
1979 Guerrero Acapulco 1.3
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More recently, it has been found that instrumentally based assessments of “tsu-
namigenic” possibility of subduction zones in the Pacific coast have underestimated 
the frequency and magnitude of great earthquakes and tsunamis [25]. The authors 
argue that geological evidence shows that in fact great tsunamis (and earthquakes) 
have occurred in the subduction zone in the past, i.e., the stretch of the coasts of 
Guerrero and Oaxaca, the southern region of Mexico.
For example, it has been found evidence of two sand tsunami deposits, 1.5 km 
inland of the coast [25]. Further, it is believed that an earthquake of M8.6 of 
magnitude occurred in 1787 and produced a giant tsunami that flooded up to 6 km 
inland. The second tsunami (less documented) occurred in the year 1537. More 
importantly, the authors conclude that great tsunamis have occurred in the Pacific 
coast of the country.
On the other hand, it should be highlighted that another geographical region 
that is not mentioned in the official reports (e.g., in Ref. [22]) in relation to the 
potential tsunami source is that related to those originating in the Caribbean Sea 
(Figure 4). It is believed that geological events such as volcanoes and earthquakes 
Figure 3. 
Local tsunamis in the pacific coast of Mexico [24].
Year Region Magnitude Tsunami (places hit, Mexico) Max. height 
waves (m)




















2003 Colima 7.8 Manzanillo 1.22
2017 Chiapas 8.1 Salina Cruz 1.10
Table 1. 
Local tsunamis-only those with wave height > 1.0 m are shown [22].
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are common and therefore the region is geological active [27]. Further, the authors 
argue that historical data has shown that there has been the occurrence of “tele-
tsunamis,” tectonic tsunamis, landslide tsunamis, and volcanic tsunamis in the 
region [27], p. 60.
That is, there has been twenty-seven “verified tsunamis” and “nine are 
considered to be very likely true tsunamis” of a total of 97 reported waves that 
might be tsunamis in the Caribbean region [27]. Moreover, it is believed that one 
of the deadliest and most recent tsunamis that hit communities in Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, and Puerto Rico occurred in 1946; the tsunami killed 1790 
people [27], p. 84.
More recently, this threat became more apparent with the occurrence of a strong 
earthquake in the region (Figure 4). That is, on 28 January 2020, an earthquake of 
M7.7 of magnitude (with a depth of 1o km) hit between the Cayman Islands and 
Jamaica and Cuba [26]. It is believed that the tremors were felt as far away as Miami, 
US. However, no causalities have been reported.
The earthquake prompted the issuing of tsunami warnings by the Pacific 
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) [28]. The PTWC’s warning was: “hazardous 
tsunami waves are possible; it is thought the warning was for communities living 
along the coasts located within 300 km from the epicentre; i.e., those include coasts 
of the following countries: the Caiman Islands, Jamaica, Belize, Cuba, Honduras, 
and Mexico (i.e., the Caribbean coast of the Yucatan Peninsula, Figure 4). The 
tsunami warning was lifted off after a few hours.
Overall, it may be argued that a potential threat of tsunamis come from the 
Caribbean Sea, although it may be regarded as extremely low (i.e., there has not 
been any data of tsunamis hitting the Caribbean coast of the Yucatan Peninsula); 
however, tsunamis are unpredictable and communities, governments should always 
be prepared for the unthinkable, because as usual, this is what happens (see Section 
3 for further details about this).
2.2 Remote tsunami risk
It is believed that on the Northwest of the “Rivera plate” (Figure 2), along the 
Gulf of California where the Pacific Plate slides north with respect to the North 
American plate, generation of tsunamis in this zone is unlikely [15, 22]. This is 
Figure 4. 
The 123 km of Lucea, Jamaica earthquake in 2020 [26].
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consistent with historical data (Table 2); it can be seen that data on “small” and 
“moderate” tsunamis generated by remote sources; for example, the two most 
recent 2010 Chile and the 2011 tsunamis (Figure 5) where the maximum wave 
heights registered were < 1.0 m. However, it is worth mentioning that the histori-
cal data showed that there were two tsunamis that registered the height of waves 
up to 2.4 and 2.5 m; that is, those generated in Chile (1960) and Alaska (1964), 
 respectively (Table 2).








1957 Aleutian Islands 8.3 Ensenada, B.C. 1.0










1960 Peru 6.8 Acapulco 0.10



























1995 Chile 7.8 Cabo San Lucas <1.0




















2018 Indonesia 7.5 — —
2018 Indonesia AK Vulcano tsunami — —
Table 2. 
Remote tsunamis- historical data taken from [22] except for the last two tsunamis that occurred in 2018.
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3. A Mexican tsunami early warning system
As mentioned in previous sections, tsunamis (and earthquakes) are unpredict-
able and can happen any time. Therefore, there is a need for an effective tsunami 
early warning system (TEWS). A system which should include not only the techni-
cal aspect but also the human issue. This section presents a preliminary model for 
such a system.
In particular, it considers the Pacific and the Caribbean coasts of Mexico 
(Section 2). However, only those aspects associated with the “structural-organisa-
tion” of the proposed model will be discussed in some detail (i.e., the five inter-
related subsystems associated with systems 1–5 and its channels of communication 
as shown in Figure 6). The proposed model is based on previous research on issues 
related to safety and disaster management systems [30–32].
In the context of this case study, the overall function of systems 2–5 (MTEW-
SMU) is to establish the key tsunami safety policies aiming at maintaining tsunami 
risk within an acceptable range; this implies allocating the necessary resources, for 
example, to build response capabilities at national and community levels.
System 1, on the other hand, embraces the following three subsystems: 
TNZO (Tsunami Northern Zone Operations), TSZO (Tsunami Southern Zone 
Operations), and TCZO (Tsunami Caribbean Zone Operations) with their associ-
ated management units (TNZ-SMU, TSZ-SMU & TCZ-SMU). These three opera-
tions of system 1 were considered given the fact that the risk of tsunamis comes 
from local and remote tsunami sources as mentioned in Section 2.
Further, it is important to highlight that one of the key functions within the 
MTEW-SMU is that related to System 2, which is associated with what it is called 
here MTEW-CC (Mexican Tsunami Early Warning-Coordination Centre); its key 
function is the monitoring, detection of a tsunami through the following coordina-
tion centres: TSZ-CC (Tsunami Southern Zone-Coordination Centre), TNZ-CC 
(Tsunami Northern Zone Coordination Centre), and TCZ-CC (Tsunami Caribbean 
Zone Coordination Centre), as shown in Figure 6. The process of the flow of key 
information and decision making process is briefly described in Table 3; Table 4, 
on the other hand, presents some of the key actors involved in the existing system 
when compared with the features of the model.
In general, communities living in active seismic areas and along coastal regions 
are vulnerable to tsunamis. These natural hazards are not that common and unpre-
dictable, but powerful and with devastating consequences to those communities in 
Figure 5. 
The 2010 Chile tsunami (left) and the 2011 tsunami in Japan (right) [29].
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their path. It is believed that tsunamis are the deadliest in terms of the proportion of 
people being killed [34].
Following the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the need for a tsunami warn-
ing system (TWS) was more than evident; however, it may be argued that the exist-
ing TWS may be deficient in dealing with the mitigation of impacts of such events; 
moreover, there are still regions worldwide without such systems.
Figure 6. 
A Mexican tsunami early warning system (MTEWS).
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Recent tsunami disasters have highlighted some of these deficiencies; for exam-
ple, in the case of the 2010 tsunami in Chile, the entity in charge of issuing a tsunami 
warning failed to do so [5], p. 30 (see “action point” “2”& “7” in Figure 6 and  
Table 3). The failure to perform this action contributed to fatalities in the coastal 
communities. More recently, the 28 September Sulawesi tsunami and the 24 
December Anak Krakatau (AK) volcano tsunami, both in Indonesia, illustrate 
deficiencies in TWS too. In the former case, the tsunami warning was issued but 
the warning was lifted over thirty minutes [4]. However, the city of Palu, located 
in a narrow bay, was hit hard with waves reaching six metres of height; why were 
not they warned? the head of the BMKG (Indonesia Agency for Meteorology, 
Climatology and Geophysics) argued that “we have no observation data at Palu…”, “If 
we had a tide gauge or proper data in Palu, of course it would have been better” [4]. 
The tsunami (and earthquake) killed over 2000 people [2]. Finally, regarding the AK 
volcano tsunami, it is thought that there was not a tsunami warning system for the 
case of volcano-induced tsunamis; however, the tsunami killed 437 people [3].
It may be argued that a TWS should not be only concerned with the techni-
cal infrastructure systems (e.g., tidal gauge, network of buoys, etc.), but also the 




“1”, “6”, “11” Flow of data on key variables monitored by MTEW-CC through TNZ-CC, TSZ-CC, 
TCZ-CC (e.g., earthquakes, pressure sensors, tide gauges, etc.). It should also be mentioned 
that this information is provided by the SSN (National Seismological Service), USGS, the 
PTWC (Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre), see Table 4.
“2&2A”, 
“7&7A”
If a strong earthquake occurs, for example, within TNZO (Tsunami Northern Zone 
Operations), then in “2”, the tsunami risk is assessed, if the key variable not withing the 
acceptable criteria (e.g., a tsunami), then it issues the tsunami warning to “2A”, which 
in turn issues the warning to the TSZ-CC, even if the risk is low (Section 2), through the 
“action point” “7A”.
In the model, the TCZ-CC also receives the warning, although in the context of this 
scenario, it is not necessary to warn communities within TCZO (Tsunami Caribbean Zone 
Operations) to take some protective actions for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the key 




“Actions points” “3&4” plan and devise measures to respond to the tsunami emergency, 
e.g., design of risk maps, plans to conduct drills, evacuation plans; etc. All of these aiming 
at better prepare the vulnerable communities within TNZO. “Action point” “3” also issues 
the tsunami warning to MTEW-SMU (i.e., to System 3). In the same vein, “action points” 
“8&9” and “13&14” perform similar functions into their respective coordination centres 
(i.e., TSZ-CC & TCZ-CC), see Figure 6 and Table 4.
“4A”, “9A”, 
“14″
Following the scenario herein, “4A” communicates the protective measures taken (e.g., 
evacuation) to the MTEW-CC, which in turn may devise further actions given its synergistic 
view of the total system through system 3, as shown in Figure 6. The same rationale applies 
to “9A” and “14” within their respective coordination centres.
“5”, “6”, “15″ “Action point” “5” issues the tsunami warning to the affected communities within this 
zone (e.g. B.C, B.C.S., Sinaloa, Manzanillo, etc.). Further, it implements all the protective 
measures to mitigate the impact of the tsunami in the coastal areas, e.g., evacuation to safe 
areas, etc. Moreover, it also implements plans to relocate the affected people to safe areas if 
necessary.
Similarly, as in “5”, “6” issues the tsunami warning to the affected communities within this 
zone (e.g. Acapulco, Oaxaca, Manzanillo, Zihuatanejo, etc.).
“Action point” “15”, issues the warning to the communities vulnerable to tsunamis within 
this zone (e.g. Cancun, etc.), see Figure 6.
Table 3. 
Description of the key action points of the model in Figure 6.
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Some of the key features of the 
model
Examples of what perform some of the functions of the existing 
system (left & Figure 6)










1. Secretariat of the Navy 
(SEMAR) manages the Tsu-
nami Warning Centre (CAT); 
the monitoring, detection, and 
forecasting centre [33].
2. Receives information from the 
SSN (National Seismological 
Service),
3. Receives the input from the 
PTWC.
4. Receives the input from the 
USGS.








Warning coordination centres within 
the CAT.
-




Same as with 1,2 & 5 above, and local/







living in the zone, 
including tourists 
& those working in 







Same as with 1,2 & 5 above, and local/
regional decision-makers, e.g., civil 
protection, etc.
-




Same as with 1,2 & 5 above, and local/







living in the zone, 
including tourists 
& those working in 
touristic resorts, such 








Same as with 1,2 & 5 above, and local/
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difficult aspect is the human factor; there is a need to better understand human 
behaviour during these events, so that make these communities less vulnerable and 
resilient to tsunamis. In other words, there is a need for an effective tsunami early 
warning system able to consider all these components in a coherent manner, such as 
the system being proposed herein and elsewhere. Further, these systems should be 
“people-centred” [21, 35].
4. Conclusions
The paper has presented the risk of tsunamis in Mexico. The approach has been 
a review of existing literature on historical data of tsunami occurrence in Mexico. 
The literature survey showed that the tsunami threat comes from local and remote 
zones. Overall, the review showed that the highest tsunami risk comes from 
tsunamis induced by earthquakes occurring in the Southern zone of the country 
(i.e., local zone). The paper has also put forward a preliminary model of a TEWS 
(Tsunami Early Warning System) for the case of Mexico. However, it needs further 
research to design the whole networks of the flows of information not only for 
the case of tsunamis, but also for the case of earthquake early warning “people-
centred” systems.
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model (Figure 6).
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